The purpose of this article is to investigate how cultural meanings associated with the left ventricular assist device inform acceptance and experience of this innovative technology when it is used as a destination therapy. We conducted open-ended, semistructured interviews with family caregivers and patients who had undergone LVAD-DT procedures at six U.S. hospitals. A grounded theory approach was used for the analysis. Thirty-nine patients and 42 caregivers participated. Participants described a sense of obligation to undergo the procedure because of its (...) promise for salvation. However, once the device was implanted, patients described being placed into a liminal state of being neither sick nor healthy, with no culturally scripted role. Consideration of end-of-life decisions was complicated by the uncertainties about how patients with LVADs die. Pre-implantation communications among patient, family, and clinicians should take into account the impact of the technology on meaning, identity, and patient experience. (shrink)

BackgroundValue-driven career attitude is considered a dimension of a protean career attitude. Individuals with this attitude seek out personally meaningful experiences and set their own psychological career success standards. This study investigates the association between value-driven career attitude and job performance. It looks at how organizational citizenship behavior affects the relationship between value-driven career attitudes and job performance.MethodsA self-reported questionnaire was used to collect data from 400 random employees of SMEs in Pakistan during the early pandemic. We chose Cochran’s formula (...) to determine the appropriate sample size, and PLS-SEM was used to analyze the model. P-O fit and self-determination theory is the theoretical lenses used in this study. The underpinning theories to this study enable the researchers to establish a link between VDCA, OCB, and job performance.ResultsBy analyzing a sample of 400 employees from active enterprises, we discover that VDCA contributes to an improvement in job performance. Furthermore, OCB plays an intervening effect in the relationship between VDCA and job performance. Thus, the study provided evidence for the underpinning models of P-O fit and self-determination theory.ConclusionThis study adds to the body of knowledge by investigating the connections between VDCA, OCB, and job performance in SMEs. The existing literature sheds scant light on these linkages, leaving a gap that this study will address. The current study expands on other themes to provide an in-depth analysis of many under-explored PCA outcomes, which may open up new avenues for future researchers to broaden and strengthen PCA with other constructs. (shrink)

In this article, we develop a new approach to integrating philosophical phenomenology with qualitative research. The approach uses phenomenology’s concepts, namely existentials, rather than methods such as the epoché or reductions. We here introduce the approach to both philosophers and qualitative researchers, as we believe that these studies are best conducted through interdisciplinary collaboration. In section 1, we review the debate over phenomenology’s role in qualitative research and argue that qualitative theorists have not taken full advantage of what philosophical phenomenology (...) has to offer, thus motivating the need for new approaches. In section 2, we introduce our alternative approach, which we call Phenomenologically Grounded Qualitative Research (PGQR). Drawing parallels with phenomenology’s applications in the cognitive sciences, we explain how phenomenological grounding can be used to conceptually front-load a qualitative study, establishing an explicit focus on one or more structures of human existence, or of our being in the world. In section 3, we illustrate this approach with an example of a qualitative study carried out by one of the authors: a study of the existential impact of early parental bereavement. In section 4, we clarify the kind of knowledge that phenomenologically grounded studies generate and how it may be integrated with existing approaches. (shrink)

In this article, I provide phenomenological reflections on patients’ experiences of undergoing extreme isolation protocols while admitted to Intensive Care Units [ICU] during the first wave of COVID-19. Based on observation studies from within the patient isolation rooms and retrospective, in-depth phenomenological interviews with patients, I characterize this exceptional experience as one of becoming anonymous. To illustrate this, I start by establishing a perspective on embodied existence as constituted on a scale between anonymous embodiment and being enrooted into a personal (...) niche. Against the backdrop of this framework, I illustrate how being admitted to the ICU under strict isolation protocols produced extraordinary experiences of becoming anonymous. Sources of the anonymization were: (1) Mechanical expropriation, pacification and disownership of the visceral-kinaesthetic body; (2) Objectification; (3) Spatial and intercorporeal anonymity (4) Surrealism: the intermingling of objective impressions and dream-like interpretations. Finally, I illustrate how anonymization induced an experience of embodiment as raw materiality, confronting the patient with what Martin Heidegger called the facticity of naked existence. This experience is discussed against Levinas’ critique of Heidegger, while I propose that insights from this exceptional case may substantiate Heidegger’s account. (shrink)

Over the past hundred years, a number of scientific investigators claim to have adduced experimental evidence for phenomena information” seems to behave like a weak signal that has to compete for the information-processing resources of the organism, a reduction of ongoing sensorimotor activity may facilitate ESP detection. Such a meaningful convergence of results suggests that psi phenomena may represent a unitary, coherent process whose nature and compatibility with current physical theory have yet to be determined. The theoretical implications and potential (...) practical applications of psi could be significant, irrespective of the small magnitude of psi effects in laboratory settings. (shrink)

Mental health research and care in the twenty first century faces a series of conceptual and ethical challenges arising from unprecedented advances in the neurosciences, combined with radical cultural and organisational change. The Oxford Textbook of Philosophy of Psychiatry is aimed at all those responding to these challenges, from professionals in health and social care, managers, lawyers and policy makers; service users, informal carers and others in the voluntary sector; through to philosophers, neuroscientists and clinical researchers. Organised around a series (...) of case studies in five key topic areas - concepts of disorder, the philosophical history of psychopathology, philosophy of science, ethics and philosophical value theory, and philosophy of mind - the book provides a detailed introduction to the field and a framework for study and skill development. Each case study is supported by selected readings from both philosophy and mental health, thinking skills exercises, self-test questions, key learning points and detailed guides to further reading. There is an introduction for philosophers to classification and descriptive psychopathology, and for practitioners to philosophical methods (including logic). The philosophical topics covered include philosophical methods (analytic and Continental); phenomenology, hermeneutics and existentialism, logical empiricism and its successors; idealism and realism; reasons and causes; and modern theories of mind and brain, free will and personal identity. Topics from mental health include psychiatry and 'anti-psychiatry'; Jaspers' psychopathology and the new neurosciences; the future of psychiatric classifications; strengths-based approaches, recovery practice, social inclusion and diversity; and key topics in psychopathology, such as delusion, autism, disorders of volition, thought insertion and other experiences in schizophrenia. The Oxford Textbook of Philosophy of Psychiatry aims to secure the skills-base of the discipline by bringing philosophers closer to the realities of practice in mental health, and mental health practitioners closer to the resources of philosophy as a partner to the sciences in responding to the challenges of twenty-first century mental health and social care. (shrink)

This paper argues that the field of chemistry underwent a significant change of theory in the early twentieth century, when atomic number replaced atomic weight as the principle for ordering and identifying the chemical elements. It is a classic case of a Kuhnian revolution. In the process of addressing anomalies, chemists who were trained to see elements as defined by their atomic weight discovered that their theoretical assumptions were impediments to understanding the chemical world. The only way to normalize the (...) anomalies was to introduce new concepts, and a new conceptual understanding of what it is to be an element. In the process of making these changes, a new scientific lexicon emerged, one that took atomic number to be the defining feature of a chemical element. (shrink)

Losing an intimate other to death belongs to the most uprooting experiences in human life. Not only is it accompanied by a range of negative emotions such as sorrow, longing, anger etc., but profound grief is a limit experience that causes a rupture in the sense of self of the bereaved. This experience is often expressed in identity statements such as ‘I no longer feel like myself’ or ‘I am missing part of myself’. Although such experiences are richly reported in (...) empirical studies on grief and implemented in diagnostic criteria for pathological grief, their experiential meaning is largely left unexplored. In this article, I suggest that being bereaved of an intimate other is self-alienating because our sense of self is a distributed phenomenon relying on daily confirmation through interaction with our habitual environment. When our lives are intertwined with intimate others, this habitual identity become a dyadic structure, relying on a heteronomy. Being bereaved of this intimate other leads to a profound impoverishment of the habituated sense of self, leading to self-alienation. Finally, I discuss the process of returning to a non-alienating state and suggest that this is not exclusively a cognitive process, but equally an embodied process of appropriating a habitual identity. (shrink)

A crucial debate currently raging in the fields of cognitive and social science centers around general and specific approaches to understanding the actions of others. When we understand the actions of another person, do we do so on the basis of a general theory of psychology, or on the basis of an effort to place ourselves in the particular position of that specific person? Hans Herbert Kögler and Karsten R. Stueber's Empathy and Agency addresses this other issues vital to current (...) social science in an advanced and diverse analysis of the foundations of social-scientific methodology based on recent cognitive psychology. The book serves as both an introduction to the debate for non-academic audiences and as a catalyst for further discussion for serious theorists. Empathy and Agency provides a solid foundation of the fundamental issues in social and cognitive science, but also presents the most influential paradigms in the field at this time. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to describe and reflect upon the concrete particulars of one academician's work as an expert ethics witness. The commentary on my practices and the narrative descriptions of three cases are offered as evidence for the thesis that it is possible to act honorably within a role that some have considered to be inherently illicit. Practical measures are described for avoiding some of the best known pitfalls. The discussion concludes with a listing of the distinctive (...) competencies and understandings that are useful in serving as an expert ethics witness. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has affected the well-being and mental health of populations worldwide. This study sought to examine whether religious coping mediated the relationship between COVID-19-related fear and death distress. We administered an online survey to 390 adult participants (66.15% females; Mage = 30.85 ± 10.19 years) across Turkey. Participants completed a series of questionnaires measuring the fear they had experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic, their levels of religious coping and their levels of death anxiety and depression. Our findings revealed (...) that (a) fear of COVID-19 was associated with positive religious coping, negative religious coping, death anxiety and death distress; (b) negative religious coping was associated with death anxiety and depression and (c) negative religious coping mediated the relationship between fear of COVID-19 and death anxiety and depression. These results highlight the detrimental effect of negative religious coping in increasing the adverse effect of the COVID-19 fear on death depression. (shrink)

Yoga-Sutras of Patanjali is a foundational psychological text that organizes, codifies, and systematically presents in s_tra form the psychology as practised in India around second century BCE. Its theme is to help humans free themselves from their congenital bondage due to conditioned existence and consequent suffering. The goal is to restore the person to her inherent unconditioned blissful being. The quintessence of Yoga is meditation. Meditation consists of dharana and dhyana, a contemplative state of passive attention precipitated by a prolonged (...) practice of concentration. Dhy_na practice leads to sam_dhi, a stand-still altered state in which the mind is controlled and restrained from habitual cognitive processing. This paper provides a theoretical background of Patanjali Yoga and a select review of empirical research on the neurophysiological correlates of meditation, highlighting on the one hand some of its methodological shortcomings and conceptual problems and suggesting on the other hand the areas of promise for further research on meditation. (shrink)

Perception is sensory awareness. Cognition is reflective awareness. Consciousness is awareness-as-such. In Indian psychology, as represented by Samkhya-Yoga and Advaita Vedanta systems, consciousness and mind are fundamentally different. Reality is the composite of being (sat), knowing (cit) and feeling (ananda). Consciousness is the knowledge side of the universe. It is the ground condition of all awareness. Consciousness is not a part or aspect of the mind. Mind is physical and consciousness is not. Consciousness does not interact with the mind, the (...) brain or any other physical objects or processes. Nor does it have any causative role in mental activity. Hence the existence of consciousness does not interfere or upset the apparently closed physical system. Mind in this view is the interfacing instrumentality that faces consciousness on one side and the brain and the rest of the physical world on the other. Mind is closely connected with the different systems of the brain. In normal perceptions, the mind takes the forms of objects via the channels of the sensory system and the processes in the brain. The forms themselves are non-conscious representations of the world of objects. The mental forms (vrittis) become conscious experiences in the light of the purusha. The vritti in sensory form is perception and with the reflection of the purusha it becomes cognition. All conscious perceptions are therefore cognitions. (shrink)

Shech (2022) offers a critical assessment of my defense of anti-realism, developed in Resisting Scientific Realism. Induction and inductive inferences play a central role in Shech’s critical analysis of my defense of realism. I argue that Shech’s criticisms that relate to induction and inductive inference are problematic, and do not constitute a threat to my defense of anti-realism. Contrary to what Shech claims, the anti-realist does not need to explain why inductive inferences are successful. That is not part of contemporary (...) realism/anti-realism debate. Further, such a demand fails to recognise that some anti-realists do not put much stock in induction. (shrink)

I challenge Gareth Eaton’s recent claim that Theodore Richards should be counted among the discoverers of isotopes. In evaluating Eaton’s claim, I draw on two influential theories of scientific discovery, one developed by Thomas Kuhn, and one developed by Augustine Brannigan. I argue that though Richards’ experimental work contributed to the discovery, his work does not warrant attributing the discovery to him. Richards’ reluctance to acknowledge isotopes is well documented. Further, the fact that he made no claim to having made (...) the discovery also undermines Eaton’s argument. (shrink)

This paper presents a natural deduction system for orthomodular quantum logic. The system is shown to be provably equivalent to Nishimura’s quantum sequent calculus. Through the Curry–Howard isomorphism, quantum $$\lambda $$ -calculus is also introduced for which strong normalization property is established.

Two dominant perspectives on consciousness representing the eastern and the western viewpoints are discussed. In the western scholarly tradition, consciousness is generally equated with the mind; intentionality is regarded as its defining characteristic; and the goal is one of seeking rational understanding of what consciousness/mind is. In the eastern tradition, as represented by the Indian approach to the study of consciousness, consciousness and mind are considered to be different; consciousness as such is believed to be nonintentional while the mind is (...) regarded as intentional; and the goal is one of developing practical methods for transformation of the human condition via realization of consciousness as such. It is suggested that consciousness encompasses two different domains, the transcendental and the phenomenal, and that humans enjoy dual citizenship in them. The eastern and western viewpoints each seems to be directed more toward one domain than the other, resulting in a biased emphasis. Seen as complementary rather than in opposition to each other, the eastern and the western perspectives may give us a more comprehensive understanding of consciousness and its role in our being. (shrink)

Most of the economic models on basic income account just for pecuniary forms of work, i. e. “time spent making money”, in employment. This restriction is a drawback of these analyses and of the standard economic labor supply model itself. If one wants to understand the potential effects of basic income on individual and social welfare, one should not restrict observation to the pecuniary uses of time. The objective of this contribution is to rethink the meaning of work usually applied (...) in economic models, based on contributions of other social scientists. This reassessment is undertaken through the development of a microeconomic model, which discusses the effects of basic income on time use and interprets work not just as a source of income, but also of non-pecuniary benefits. Further, we disentangle the usual work-leisure dichotomy in two other ones. (shrink)

Goff argues that Galileo erred in denying that sensory qualities are present in the physical world and that we should correct his error by supposing that all matter has an intrinsic conscious aspect. This paper argues that we should be open to another theoretical option. Galileo's real error, I argue, was not about the location of sensory qualities, but about their very existence. Like most people, Galileo assumed that sensory qualities are instantiated somewhere. I argue that this is a theoretical (...) assumption which can and should be questioned. If we drop it, we can give a natural account of the function of sensory quality talk and explain how our puzzlement about consciousness arises. (shrink)

This article investigates the profound mysteries of consciousness and the afterlife, which have captivated humanity for centuries. In our study, we conducted three hypothetical experiments, assuming all participants had healthy brains and minds in similar environments. We based our methodology on the premise that cell death can preserve anatomical and neural integrity (Vrselja et al., 2019). Between T1 and T2, six brains were rendered non-functional (brain death), eliminating consciousness. Participants were divided into three groups: -/- 1. Identical Triplets (Group I): (...) Individuals 'a,' 'b,' and 'c.' 2. Second Set of Identical Triplets (Group II): Individuals 'd,' 'e,' and 'f.' 3. Non-identical Triplets (Group III): Individuals 'g,' 'h,' and 'i.' -/- Uniform conditions were maintained across all groups, ensuring identical nutrients and processes. In the third experiment, we preserved the inactive brains of 'a,' 'b,' 'd,' 'e,' 'g,' and 'h' from **T1** to **T2** and created three new identical brains for each participant, resulting in twenty-seven new brains labeled ('a1' to 'i3'). The original six brains were revived, leading to a total of thirty-six participant brains in the lab. -/- Results -/- If our third experiment holds validity, it suggests that all twenty-seven artificially created brains and the revived six brains could function, resulting in thirty-six operational brains at T2. This includes the three live brains of 'c,' 'f,' and 'i.' -/- Discussion -/- Determining whose consciousness resides within the lab is practically impossible, except for 'c,' 'f,' and 'i.' For instance, if you are 'a' before *T1*, identifying which of the eleven identical brains ('a', 'a1', 'a2', 'a3', etc.) contains your consciousness at *T2* is challenging. Assuming your consciousness exists in all eleven brains post *T1* raises critical questions: Did your singular consciousness cease to exist, or did it transfer to a specific brain outside the lab? This dilemma highlights profound implications for our understanding of consciousness and identity. -/- Conclusion -/- If your existence ceased (no afterlife- discontinued 'your'-'a'- consciousness-) at T1, theoretically, "you (a)" could reappear ( at T2 ) in two or more identical brains, in the laboratory setting. However, as extensively discussed in this research, a single consciousness can't exist in multiple brains simultaneously. While there may be two, many, or even infinite identical brains in the universe/s, no one experiences( 'feel-aware' ) their consciousness in multiple places simultaneously. Although, the brain's quality and quantity continually change over time—encompassing aspects such as neurons, neurochemistry, and the biophysics of brain function—unique consciousness persists from childhood to death within a single brain. The hypothesis concerning the continuum of unique consciousness within the dynamic framework of the material brain presents a complex enigma. It posits that two unknown fundamental particles—one universally unique ( to a certain brain) and invariant and the other subject to continuous evolution—coexist within the brain throughout its functional lifespan. This coexistence may elucidate the mechanisms underlying consciousness and its persistence, despite the brain's ongoing structural and functional transformations. This simple reasoning strongly supports the high probability of life ('your' -' a') after death occurring in a single brain at T1,( outside the lab) without any passage of time. (shrink)

Both philosophers and scientists have long assumed that the impetus to develop and hold afterlife beliefs was primarily provided by one’s fear of one’s own death (an egocentric view). Recent empirical studies, however, present compelling evidence against this assumption: it has been observed that participants intuitively believe that others survive death (an allocentric view). Despite this, most theories offered to explain this finding rely on egocentric mechanisms and claim that the deceased are represented as disembodied minds. Here, the author offers (...) an allocentric explanation for intuitive afterlife beliefs based on the intentional stance and offline social reasoning which suggests that the deceased should be represented as socially embodied. The author then argues that this socially embodied representation is more in line with both the findings and folk descriptions of those in the afterlife. Finally, the author discusses the impact on both the scientific and philosophical investigations into afterlife beliefs. (shrink)

As exemplified by three cases, difficulties in the dialogue between religion and science not infrequently arise from differing views of God's omnipotence and omniscience. From the side of theology, reflections on the biblical and church‐related sources of those views, on Auschwitz and theproblem of theodicy, on God as Creator of the universe, and on how to read and interpret the Bible show that a view of a God who self‐limits almightiness and all‐knowing in order to grant freedom and functional integrity (...) to a Creation about which God cares can be multiply justified. Such a view is not dissonant with regard to a self‐organized, open universe, producing “unexpected” emergent features as seen by science. (shrink)

In the current climate of dramatic advances in the neurosciences, it has been widely assumed that the diagnosis of mental disorder is a matter exclusively for value-free science. Starting from a detailed case history, this paper describes how, to the contrary, values come into the diagnosis of mental disorders, directly through the criteria at the heart of psychiatry's most scientifically grounded classification, the American Psychiatric Association's DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual). Various possible interpretations of the prominence of values in psychiatric (...) diagnosis are outlined. Drawing on work in the Oxford analytic tradition of philosophy, it is shown that, properly understood, the prominence of psychiatric diagnostic values reflects the necessary engagement of psychiatry with the diversity of individual human values. This interpretation opens up psychiatric diagnostic assessment to the resources of a new skills-based approach to working with complex and conflicting values (also derived from analytic philosophy) called 'values-based practice.' Developments in values-based practice in training, policy and research in mental health are briefly outlined. The paper concludes with an indication of how the integration of values-based with evidence-based approaches provides the basis for psychiatric practice in the twenty-first century that is both science-based and person-centred. (shrink)

Nature and Narrative is the launch volume in a new series of books entitled International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry. Nature(representing interest in the causes of a problem) and Narrative (for understanding its meanings) will introduce the field and the series, by touching on a range of issue relevant to this interdisciplinary 'border country'.

It is well known that successive observations of the instantaneous state of a decaying system lead to a modified decay law. In the limit of infinitely frequent observations, the modified lifetime becomes infinite (“Zeno's paradox”). We study here the behavior of decaying systems under continuous rather than successive observations. Such continuous observation is achieved by a permanent coupling of the decaying system to a counter, which is sufficiently sensitive to the presence of the decay products. For two explicitly soluble models (...) we obtain a result very similar to Zeno's paradox: The observation again strongly modifies the decay law, and prevents the decay completely in the limit of a perfect (i.e., infinitely sensitive) counter. Like Zeno's paradox, however, this “watchdog effect” is not very likely to be detected in actual experiments, e.g., with radioactive nuclei. (shrink)

This book discusses the profound philosophy and practical psychology behind yoga, beyond its popular body-culture aspect. It pays particular attention to the psychological principles involved and their implications for the consummate understanding of human nature. It explores the psychological aspects of yoga theory and practice and discusses the aphorisms in Patanjali's treatise on Yoga with necessary commentary in current psychological terminology to make them intelligible to students of psychology and other interested readers. Importantly, the author draws out the implications of (...) these aphorisms for future psychological study and research. The book discusses the author's concept of yoga of nonviolence which brings in Gandhian ideas into the framework of yoga. The author's own vast experience in creating interfaces of yoga research with practice also informs the discussions in this book. This authoritative and topical book by an eminent academic like Professor Ramakr ishna Rao is of interest to scholars and students of diverse disciplines, including but not limited to psychology, philosophy and wellbeing research. (shrink)

The ability of the mind to conceptualize what is not present is essential. It allows us to reason counterfactually about what might have happened had events unfolded differently or had another course of action been taken. It allows us to think about what might happen – to perform 'Gedankenexperimente' (thought experiments) – before we act. However, the cognitive and neural mechanisms mediating this ability are poorly understood. We suggest that the frontopolar cortex (FPC) keeps track of and evaluates alternative choices (...) (what we might have done), whereas the anterior lateral prefrontal cortex (alPFC) compares simulations of possible future scenarios (what we might do) and evaluates their reward values. Together, these brain regions support the construction of suppositional scenarios. (shrink)

This authoritative volume, written by two well-known psychologist-philosophers, presents a model of the person and its implications for psychological theory and practice. Professors Ramakrishna Rao and Anand Paranjpe draw the contours of Indian psychology, describe the methods of study, explain crucial concepts, and discuss the central ideas and their application, illustrating them with insightful case studies and judicious reviews of available research data and existing scholarly literature. The main theme is organized around the thesis that psychology is the study of (...) the person and that the person is a unique composite of body, mind and consciousness. The goal of the person is self-realization. Self-realization consists in the realization of one's true self as distinct from the manifest ego and it is facilitated by cultivating consciousness. Cultivating consciousness leads to a kind of psycho-spiritual symbiosis resulting in personal transformation, altruistic value orientation and flowering of the hidden human potential. (shrink)

Errol Morris has claimed that Kuhn threw an ashtray at him during a dispute about some matter in the history of science. Morris also claims that Kuhn threw him out of the graduate program at Princeton for disagreeing with him. I argue that Morris’ attack on Kuhn contains some degree of hyperbole. Further, I present evidence that shows that Morris is mistaken about key events during this period. In fact, Kuhn was supportive of Morris in his pursuit of a career (...) in the history of science. (shrink)